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DACA, GOVERNMENT LAWYERS,
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Stephen Lee* & Sameer M. Ashar**
INTRODUCTION
On June 15, 2012, the Obama administration announced a significant
change in immigration policy: Homeland Security Secretary Janet
Napolitano began to instruct immigration officials to defer enforcement
actions against those noncitizens who would likely be eligible for relief under
the DREAM Act,1 should Congress choose to pass it.2 This program, which
came to be known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), has
become the most significant immigration-benefits program in a generation.
Not since Congress passed a comprehensive reform bill in 1986, which
included a pathway to citizenship,3 has an immigration program so quickly
and positively changed the lives of unauthorized migrants. Under DACA,
migrants who met criteria mirroring those included in the DREAM Act could
pay an application fee and apply for deferred-action status.4 If granted such
status, these migrants would be taken out of the pool of removable migrants
* Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development and Professor of Law, University
of California, Irvine School of Law.
** Vice Dean for Experiential Education and Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. This
Article was prepared for the Colloquium entitled The Varied Roles, Regulation, and
Professional Responsibilities of Government Lawyers, hosted by the Fordham Law Review
and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics on October 12, 2018, at Fordham University School
of Law. For an overview of the Colloquium, see Bruce A. Green, Lawyers in Government
Service—a Foreword, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1791 (2019). For helpful comments and
conversations, we would like to thank Susan Bibler Coutin, Scott Cummings, Marc-Tizoc
González, Sung Hui Kim, Jon Michaels, Hiroshi Motomura, Doug NeJaime, and participants
in workshops at Fordham and the University of Washington School of Law. This research
was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation. Susan Bibler Coutin is the
Principal Investigator on the project. Jennifer Chacón in addition to the authors of this Article
are Co-Principal Investigators.
1. DREAM Act of 2011, S. 952, 112th Cong. (2011). The DREAM Act proposed
immigration relief for individuals who have been in the United States continuously for five
years, were fifteen years old or younger when they entered the United States initially, had
attained specific educational benchmarks, and who had not committed enumerated offenses.
Id. § 3(b)(1).
2. Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secretary Napolitano Announces Deferred
Action Process for Young People Who Are Low Enforcement Priorities (June 15, 2012),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/06/15/secretary-napolitano-announces-deferred-actionprocess-young-people-who-are-low [https://perma.cc/SG5M-25F6].
3. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359.
4. See Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 2.
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on a two-year renewable basis.5 Equally important, DACA conferred
additional benefits, including employment authorization that allowed
beneficiaries to enter the formal labor market.6
Prior to 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) circulated
prosecutorial discretion memos, which laid out removal priorities and
instructed immigration officials to close cases for migrants who did not fit
those priorities.7 These memos came to be known colloquially as the
“Morton memos” after U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Director John Morton, who authored them. So, why did DHS move away
from this prosecutorial-discretion model to DACA to screen out Dreamers8
from the removal pipeline?
A common explanation is that DACA was an attempt by President Obama
to further centralize decision-making authority within the White House and
those with immediate access, like political appointees. These officials were
much more likely to share the president’s values and views on immigration
enforcement, unlike frontline officers who, as civil servants, worked across
administrations and enjoyed employment protections. By this account, such
a move was necessary to overcome efforts by frontline officers, especially
within ICE (the agency with primary immigration enforcement
responsibilities) to thwart or frustrate the president’s agenda.9
This Article joins the conversation regarding the shift to implement DACA
and, in doing so, adds an empirical dimension. Drawing from seventeen
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t,
to All Field Office Dirs., All Special Agents in Charge, All Chief Counsel (June 17, 2011),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3PV7-Y8AN]; Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enf’t, to All ICE Emps. (Mar. 2, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/
releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JGU-8C85]; Memorandum from
John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to All ICE Emps. (June
30, 2010) [hereinafter June 2010 Morton Memo], https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/
releases/2010/civil-enforcement-priorities.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6T7-LCTJ].
8. We use the term “Dreamer” as shorthand for the category of immigrants in the United
States who would have benefited from passage of the DREAM Act. We use the term advisedly
and acknowledge serious criticism of it, as well as the advocacy narrative surrounding it.
Critics have argued that the Dreamer narrative delineates between deserving and undeserving
immigrants, reinforcing the marginalization of adults who crossed the border into the United
States and those who have become enmeshed in an expanding criminal legal system. See
Elizabeth Keyes, Defining American: The DREAM Act, Immigration Reform and Citizenship,
14 NEV. L.J. 101, 141–54 (2013); Fanny Lauby, Leaving the ‘Perfect DREAMer’ Behind?
Narratives and Mobilization in Immigration Reform, 15 SOC. MOVEMENT STUD. 374, 380–82
(2016).
9. See Ming H. Chen, Administrator-in-Chief: The President and Executive Action in
Immigration Law, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 347, 385–86 (2017); see also Jason A. Cade, Enforcing
Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 693–94 (2015); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M.
Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 187–88 (2015);
Anil Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and the Rule of Law Basis
for Executive Action on Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 58, 89–90 (2015); Hiroshi
Motomura, The President’s Dilemma: Executive Authority, Enforcement, and the Rule of Law
in Immigration Law, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 23 (2015).
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interviews with political appointees within the executive branch during the
Obama administration, as well as documents obtained under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), this Article makes two points. First, our findings
tend to confirm the “centralization” thesis. Our interview subjects—political
appointees within the Obama White House and DHS—tended to confirm that
DACA was intended at least in part to neutralize the influence wielded by
frontline ICE officers, who tended to embrace an aggressive approach to
enforcement.10 Rather than trusting “immigration cops” within ICE to sort
migrants for removal, political appointees opted to empower immigration
officials within the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS), an agency with experience in redistributing benefits to
immigrants.11
Second, this Article draws attention to an element of the DACA story that
has thus far appeared intermittently or as an afterthought: the role of lawyers
in the enforcement and administration of our nation’s immigration laws. Our
data shows that political appointees embraced competing notions of
government lawyering as they attempted to find relief for Dreamers through
regulatory channels. In trying to provide Dreamers with relief through the
Morton memos, the executive relied on a vision of lawyering commonly
associated with the prosecution of criminal laws. This vision of
prosecutorial justice elevates the judgment of lawyers above others involved
in the removal process, including that of the ICE officers identifying and
apprehending potentially removable immigrants as well as the political
appointees empowered to set the enforcement agenda during the Obama
years. This contrasts with the vision of lawyering at the heart of DACA.
The process by which government officials assess and adjudicate
applications within the DACA setting differs from the Morton memos
approach in some obvious ways. Notably, noncitizens self-screen and
affirmatively apply for benefits under DACA whereas within the Morton
memos scheme, noncitizens operated from a position of weakness as they
negotiated relief as a supplicant while caught in the removal pipeline. Just
as notable is that lawyering within the DACA model operated at a great
distance from the actual adjudication of DACA applications—that is, the
legal work emanated from counsel appointed to serve the president and the
Secretary of Homeland Security rather than in the halls and conference rooms
of the various ICE field offices. This model of administrative justice was on
display in the rollout of both DACA and the now-defunct expanded DACA
and Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA) programs, which
were accompanied by a meticulous legal analysis provided by the
Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Legal Counsel.12 Thus, our account
suggests that while lawyers were central to the administration of immigration
10. See infra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
11. See Chen, supra note 9, at 384–85.
12. See Memorandum from Karl R. Thompson, Principal Deputy Att’y Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, to the Sec’y of Homeland Sec. and Counsel to the President (Nov. 19, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/file/179206/download [https://perma.cc/CFS6-LQ7X].
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laws under the Morton memos approach, they operated at a greater distance
from the daily implementation process. The USCIS officers reviewing and
evaluating DACA applications possessed far less discretion than Office of
the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA) lawyers, and that is because the “legal
work” they performed looked less like that of prosecutors in the criminal
system and more like that of asylum or social security benefits officers who
operated within a narrower set of parameters.
The period preceding and leading into DACA provides a useful
opportunity to advance the discussion of the ethical basis for government
lawyering. In a client-centered profession, government lawyers have
presented some conceptual challenges given the indeterminacy and
heterogeneity of the range of interests the federal government is supposed to
serve. We save an extended treatment of this question for another day, but
in the meantime, we offer some tentative thoughts on from where an ethical
basis might arise in the context of immigration law. We focus on three
conceptions in particular. Two of these conceptions are longstanding fixtures
of the law and legal scholarship, but to our knowledge, legal scholars have
not sufficiently extended discussions about these principles to the
immigration context and certainly not to the DACA chapter in modern
immigration history.
One is the conception of normative innocence, sometimes referred to as
mercy. This is the principle that executive branch officials can and should
use their vast discretionary powers to protect those who have violated the law
as a formal matter but who have not violated basic tenets of morality. A
second is the conception of the public interest. This reflects the notion that
government lawyers, and governmental actors generally, ought to pursue
policies that broadly serve the public’s interest rather than the narrower
imperative of their agency or self-interested elected officials. A third and
final conception, social movement mobilization, is relatively undertheorized
in legal scholarship. Normative innocence and the public interest are
constructed through the mobilization and exercise of political power. Social
movements amalgamate and amplify the voices of the politically weak. This
Article moves us toward a deeper examination of the process by which public
power may be deployed or constrained through the discretion of government
lawyers.
We draw our observations from two primary datasets. The first is based
on semi-structured interviews with seventeen government officials who
previously served in the Obama administration.13 All but one of the
interviews lasted between an hour and an hour and a half and were conducted
over the phone during a single session.14 All of the interviewees worked
either in the White House or in an executive federal agency during the Obama
13. All of these interviews conformed with an interview protocol approved by the
University of California, Irvine Institutional Review Board. Each interview subject provided
informed consent. We identify interview subjects only by pseudonym and agency affiliation,
but not title, to preserve anonymity.
14. One interview was split between two separate sessions.

2019]

DACA AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

1883

administration. At the time of the interviews, during the Trump
administration, none of our interviewees were working within the executive
branch, which is not uncommon when a president from a different political
party assumes office. We relied on snowball sampling, which is a useful tool
for gathering data among populations that are difficult or costly to identify.15
This was particularly helpful for identifying government officials who helped
draft, shape, and implement the content of both the pre-DACA and DACA
immigration-enforcement programs. Toward the end of the data-gathering
period, when asked whether we should be contacting other officials involved
in shaping these programs, interview subjects began offering the same
names, which helps confirm the completeness of the sampling set.16
Like any dataset, our interview dataset is limited in terms of the types of
observations it can support. In particular, datasets created through snowball
sampling can reflect the bias of the networks to which we have access.17
Because we identified many interviewees through referrals, we face the
problem of oversampling—that is, those with larger personal networks likely
had an outsized impact on the pool of interviewees.18 To help correct for this
bias, we also considered a second dataset, one that was exogenously created.
Journalists obtained internal government documents from an ICE field office
in Houston through a FOIA request.19 This dataset contains its own
limitations, namely that it was created in 2011,20 prior to the announcement
of DACA. But, at least as to the period immediately following the
announcement of the Morton memos, this dataset tends to confirm our
findings and conclusions about that period in the Houston field office.
Relying on these internal documents also provides certain methodological
advantages. In particular, internal exchanges such as email records provide
a less filtered portrayal of agency dynamics than would in-person interviews,
which might produce scripted answers.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a picture of immigration
lawyers in federal government not featured in scholarship up to this point.
This includes the frontline immigration prosecutors in ICE, agency officials
at the upper echelons of ICE, USCIS, and DHS, and policy advisors in the
White House and at the Office of Legal Counsel.
Part II retells the story of immigration enforcement during the Obama
administration roughly between 2010 and 2012. Here, we show that our data
largely confirms the centralization thesis advanced by immigration scholars.
Importantly, our data shows that professional identity and competing
15. See Seymour Sudman & Graham Kalton, New Developments in the Sampling of
Special Populations, 12 ANN. REV. SOC. 401, 413 (1986).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Douglas D. Heckathorn, Respondent-Driven Sampling: A New Approach to the
Study of Hidden Populations, 44 SOC. PROBS. 174, 175 (1997).
19. See, e.g., Susan Carroll, Report: Feds Downplayed ICE Case Dismissals, HOUS.
CHRON. (June 27, 2011), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Report-Fedsdownplayed-ICE-case-dismissals-2080532.php [https://perma.cc/Z36R-CFL7].
20. Id.
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conceptions of government lawyering played a key part in the process by
which executive authority was centralized. During the pre-DACA years,
political appointees relied on notions of government lawyering developed in
the criminal law enforcement context. By issuing guidance documents and
setting enforcement priorities, immigration enforcement during this era
operated under the assumption that the immigration attorney had a
comparative advantage in terms of identifying the kinds of cases that should
be screened out of the removal pipeline. This is how much of the criminal
law enforcement system operates and, in fact, this was part of the messaging
that OPLA attorneys received. Thus, the creation of DACA amounted to a
reassignment of discretionary authority, away from OPLA attorneys and
away from frontline officers in meaningful ways. Instead, DACA is
characterized by legal expertise operating at the senior levels of
administration.
With a clear picture of the different ways that government lawyers shape
immigration policy, Part III wrestles with the larger questions of what ethical
constraints, if any, can limit and therefore legitimate the exercise of legal
authority in this context. Borrowing from the legal-profession literature, we
focus on two types of potential limitations, normative innocence and the
public interest, and the process by which the politically weak may contribute
to a delineation of these conceptions.
I. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS IN THE GOVERNMENT
Over the last several years, legal scholars have generated an important and
helpful body of work focusing on the relationship between administrative
practice and immigration law.21 One way to understand this work is as an
attempt to disaggregate and examine the various components that comprise
the “executive.”22 The result has been a crisper and more precise
understanding of who exactly is “tak[ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed,”23 at least in the immigration realm. This Part contributes to this
project of disaggregation by foregrounding the work of lawyers within the
executive dedicated to the implementation of federal immigration laws.24
A core function of the government is to effectuate the immigration code’s
deportation, or removal, provisions. These provisions invite great concern
because of the human consequences of the expulsion of noncitizens.
Lawyers feature prominently throughout this process. Removal decisions are
not adjudicated before Article III courts. Rather, these decisions are largely
resolved at the administrative level before immigration judges (IJs), who are
21. See generally Chen, supra note 9; Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 9; Jill E. Family,
Administrative Law Through the Lens of Immigration Law, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 565 (2012);
Cristina M. Rodríguez, Constraint Through Delegation: The Case of Executive Control over
Immigration Policy, 59 DUKE L.J. 1787 (2010).
22. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 9, at 359.
23. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
24. For a helpful examination of the pathologies associated with our immigration judge
corps, which is comprised of lawyers, see generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring
Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635 (2010).
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housed within the DOJ.25 IJs are the primary adjudicators within the
immigration system and, by department regulation, they are required to be
lawyers.26 The DOJ also houses the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA),
which handles most appellate matters related to IJ decisions.27 Congress has
given the power to adjudicate immigration matters to the Attorney General
by statute, but like IJs, the BIA is purely a creation of regulation.28
The federal immigration system separates the adjudication of removal
from its prosecution in administering these removal provisions. The federal
lawyers charged with the responsibility of initiating removal proceedings
against noncitizens work within ICE, which is housed in an entirely different
department than IJs and the BIA.29 Specifically, lawyers working within the
OPLA—a program within ICE—represent the DHS in removal proceedings
before IJs.30 OPLA employs 1100 lawyers and 350 support personnel.31 It
is divided into several “Offices of Chief Counsel,” which are scattered
throughout the United States.32 As removal orders are appealed to the federal
courts, lawyers in the Office of Immigration Litigation represent the
government,33 but OPLA lawyers provide support throughout the process.34
Of course, in a technical sense, OPLA lawyers oversee a regulatory regime
grounded in civil law and penalties, and yet the influence they wield over the
criminal system warrants a broader critique. As legal scholars have
persuasively argued, our immigration system provides an uneven and
asymmetric set of protections and freely allows for the intermingling between
criminal and civil legal tools to give federal regulators the greatest advantage

25. Beyond the IJs, federal district courts and magistrate judges play an important role in
the adjudication of immigration-related crimes. Federal prosecutors initiate immigrationrelated criminal charges for crimes such as illegal reentry and smuggling before Article III
courts. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (2010).
Magistrate judges oversee “petty courts” to resolve misdemeanor charges like mere illegal
entry (as opposed to illegal reentry after removal). Id. at 1288.
26. See Immigration Judge, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/legal-careers/
job/immigration-judge [https://perma.cc/WB4J-L9N4] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
27. Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/boardof-immigration-appeals [https://perma.cc/9P2N-LQZS] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
28. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a), (h) (2018).
29. See Who We Are, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/
about [https://perma.cc/7RLR-4HSL] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
30. Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA), U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/opla#wcm-survey-target-id [http://perma.cc/B9P3-SYP6]
(last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
31. See id.
32. See Principal Legal Advisor Offices, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
https://www.ice.gov/contact/legal [https://perma.cc/CJ4E-TNYD] (last visited Mar. 15,
2019).
33. This office is lodged within the DOJ. See Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. DEP’T
JUST., https://www.justice.gov/civil/office-immigration-litigation [https://perma.cc/3WS7EFJH] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
34. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2019 BUDGET IN BRIEF 33 (2018),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20BIB%202019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N56V-VMUQ].
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possible over noncitizens.35 In addition to their power to initiate and to
represent the government in removal proceedings, OPLA lawyers work
closely with federal criminal prosecutors lodged within the DOJ. To assist
criminal prosecutors, OPLA lawyers can exercise their discretion to delay the
enforcement of immigration laws or effectuation of removal.36
An interagency program known as the “Special Assistant United States
Attorney” (SAUSA) program allows government immigration lawyers to do
a rotation within the DOJ prosecuting immigration-related crimes.37 As
Ingrid Eagly has documented, the program allows attorneys within the
Border Patrol and ICE to oversee large-scale enforcement actions, especially
within the illegal-entry context.38 The SAUSA program is also notable for
the space it makes for nonlawyers to carry out lawyerly responsibilities.39 As
Professor Eagly observes, Border Patrol agents (that is, nonlawyers) have
from time to time carried out misdemeanor prosecutions for illegal entry.40
Under this arrangement, Border Patrol agents represent the government in
court and handle all aspects of that prosecution unless the defendant requests
a trial involving a licensed attorney.41
Aside from the enforcement of immigration laws, the other major role
undertaken by agencies is the distribution of immigration-related benefits.
The most recognizable program in this regard has been the DACA program,
which conferred upon its beneficiaries the opportunity to obtain work
authorization or “papers.”42 This program was administered by USCIS,
which is a separate agency from ICE.43 Strictly speaking, DACA
applications were not adjudicated by lawyers, but USCIS did employ an
internal review process that utilized legal expertise.
In particular, USCIS appointed a person to serve as ombudsman.44 This
was a position created by statute under the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
which reorganized immigration agencies.45 Like many ombudsman
35. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 613, 631–32, 636–39 (2012); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of
Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 469, 475 (2007).
36. See Protecting the Homeland: Tool Kit for Prosecutors, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT (Apr. 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/osltc/pdf/tool-kit-forprosecutors.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZCJ8-BQ5V]; see also David Alan Sklansky, Crime,
Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 220–21 (2012).
37. See Eagly, supra note 25, at 1332.
38. See id.
39. Id. at 1333.
40. See id. at 1332–33.
41. See id. at 1333.
42. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.
43. See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/archive/consideration-deferred-action-childhoodarrivals-daca [https://perma.cc/2RT6-34QW] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
44. Ombudsman—Case
Assistance,
U.S.
DEP’T
HOMELAND
SECURITY,
https://www.dhs.gov/case-assistance [https://perma.cc/S36H-66V7] (last visited Mar. 15,
2019).
45. Specifically, Congress provides: “Within the Department, there shall be a position of
Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman (in this section referred to as the
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programs, this office within USCIS is charged with resolving problems
between and among affected members of the public and decision makers
within the agency.46 The ombudsman has no formal enforcement authority.47
She can only make recommendations in particular cases.48
Most of the ombudsman’s power lies in documentation of agency
performance as a whole. She is required to summarize and create an
inventory of major problems plaguing the agency with an annual report to
Congress.49 Importantly, Congress intended for the ombudsman to enjoy
some measure of independence and autonomy. Congress requires the
ombudsman to send its annual report without any “prior comment or
amendment” by senior leadership,50 and each local ombudsman office must
have forms of communication that are not subject to USCIS control or
oversight.51 The ombudsman’s power is akin to that wielded by inspectors
general.52
Finally, beyond enforcement and benefit programs, DHS utilizes legal
expertise the way many agencies do, namely through general counsel offices.
Just as ICE benefits from OPLA lawyers, other agencies with primary
immigration responsibilities, such as USCIS and Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), also utilize the services of “Chief Counsels.”53 While
lawyers at the leadership level are political appointee positions—that is,
lawyers who had to be confirmed by the Senate54—most operated as a part
of the civil service corps. The DHS indicates that over 1800 lawyers serve
as general counsel.55 General counsel facilitate the implementation of
immigration laws by providing advice on the legality of a variety of programs
and initiatives.56

‘Ombudsman’). The Ombudsman shall report directly to the Deputy Secretary. The
Ombudsman shall have a background in customer service as well as immigration law.” See
Homeland Security Act § 452, 6 U.S.C. § 272(a) (2012).
46. See Ombudsman—Case Assistance, supra note 44.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See 6 U.S.C. § 272(c)(1) (2012).
50. See id. § 272(c)(2).
51. See id. § 272(g)(2).
52. See Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and National
Security Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1034–35 (2013); see also Shirin Sinnar, Internal
Oversight and the Tenuous Protection of Norms, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 61, 62 (2018).
53. See Department of Homeland Security, Office of the General Counsel, Organization
Chart Level 1, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY (Aug. 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/OGC%20Level%201%20%205-16.%20Generic.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V9K5-RAQU].
54. CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS & MICHAEL GREENE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30959,
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEE POSITIONS REQUIRING SENATE CONFIRMATION AND COMMITTEES
HANDLING NOMINATIONS 23, 35, 39, 41 (2017).
55. See Office of the General Counsel, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY,
https://www.dhs.gov/office-general-counsel [https://perma.cc/W763-ZG9M] (last visited
Mar. 15, 2019).
56. Id.
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II. FROM PROSECUTORIAL TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
Immigration-enforcement policy during the Obama administration has
been characterized as an exercise of centralization. Frustrated by a vast
constellation of field offices, each operating largely independent of one
another and without regard to the preferences of the White House, President
Obama and senior leadership within the DHS set about to bring frontline
immigration officials into alignment. As we show in this Part, empirical data
supports this centralization thesis.
On December 18, 2010, the DREAM Act failed to clear the Senate.57
From then on, immigrant youth activists increasingly came to focus on the
formation of enforcement policy within DHS.58 Importantly, as our data
shows, the means by which the executive centralized authority utilized logic
that is grounded in competing notions of lawyering and professional identity.
Between this period and June 15, 2012, when DACA was announced, the
DHS utilized a prosecutorial-justice model to help more equitably protect a
category of immigrants who would be harshly impacted by removal.59 Over
time, this category evolved to become largely congruent with the Dreamer
population. White House and senior DHS officials sought to create a new
culture among its immigration lawyers so that government lawyers
reimagined themselves as federal criminal prosecutors akin to U.S. attorneys.
This is significant because, as mentioned earlier, the law treats immigration
law—and therefore, the work that government officials do in this area—as
civil, not criminal.60 And yet, political appointees often and freely borrowed
from notions of prosecutorial discretion developed largely in the criminal
context to implement their mandate. Ultimately, the DHS struggled to
successfully screen out Dreamers through this model, which helped lead to
the creation of the DACA program. From a professional-identity standpoint,
the hallmark of the DACA program was the use of legal expertise at the
highest level of administration rather than at the moment of frontline
implementation.
A. Priorities and Nonpriorities
Not long after Janet Napolitano was confirmed as Secretary of Homeland
Security, she and her deputies began working to streamline the immigrantremoval process. Working closely with senior leadership in the three major
immigration agencies—ICE, USCIS, and CBP—Secretary Napolitano and
the DHS senior leadership sought out ways to maximize their resources. The
primary strategy DHS relied upon was priority-setting—that is, identifying
57. See Procedural Vote on DREAM Act Fails in Senate, CNN (Dec. 18, 2010),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/12/18/congress.dream.act/index.html [http://perma.cc/
JSP2-MMMQ].
58. See Sameer M. Ashar, Movement Lawyers in the Fight for Immigrant Rights, 64
UCLA L. REV. 1464, 1473–90 (2017) (describing the evolution of advocacy and activism in
the context of the legislative paralysis between 2010 and 2012).
59. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 25–35 and accompanying text.
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the specific groups that immigration officials should target for removal.61
ICE Director John Morton was crucial in this regard. He issued a series of
memos articulating the types of migrants ICE officials should target, policies
on prosecutorial discretion, and instituting interagency collaborations to
ensure that those otherwise-removable immigrants who had nonfrivolous
claims for relief had the chance to pursue them on an expedited basis.62 He
issued these “Morton memos” over a span of two years beginning in the
summer of 2010.63
One of the ways that ICE separated priorities from nonpriorities was
through the presence of a pending application for an immigrant visa. In
deciding whether to proceed with the removal of apprehended migrants, John
Morton instructed agency personnel to focus on whether the migrant had a
pending application with USCIS that might serve as the basis for relief
against removal.64 This directive both focused ICE’s attention on the
presence of these factors in the removal process and instructed USCIS to
engage in an expedited review of such migrants.65
To the extent the Morton memos offered any kind of relief, such relief was
defined in the negative—that is, migrants who were not an enforcement
priority could take some comfort in knowing that they faced a statistically
low chance of being expelled from the country. At least this is how senior
officials described that system.
One interviewee, David, has had a long career in federal law
enforcement.66 He served as a part of senior leadership in ICE during the
first several years of the Obama administration.67 He described the years
governed by the Morton memos in these terms:
Let’s say the majority of the 11 or 12 million people who are here in
undocumented status . . . you know, they have virtually no chance of being
arrested these days. ICE is not out there looking for undocumented aliens
who have not committed crimes, who don’t pose a threat to the community.
They’re just not. So, you don’t want to put yourself in the situation in the
future where you might become a priority.68

61. Testimony of Secretary Napolitano Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, “Oversight
of the Department of Homeland Security,” U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY (May 6, 2009),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/05/07/secretary-napolitanos-testimony-oversightdepartment-homeland-security [https://perma.cc/U56F-QMR5] (“In identifying individuals
for removal, DHS will prioritize those who pose the most obvious threats to public safety.”).
62. See supra note 7.
63. See supra note 7.
64. Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enf’t, to Peter S. Vincent, Principal Legal Advisor, and James Chaparro, Exec. Assoc. Dir. 2
(Aug. 20, 2010) [hereinafter August 2010 Morton Memo], https://www.ice.gov/doclib/
detention-reform/pdf/aliens-pending-applications.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5JS-59RZ].
65. Id.
66. Interview with David, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t (May 19, 2016) (transcript
on file with authors).
67. Id.
68. Id.
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Another senior official, also within ICE, concurred: “If they’re not
committing a crime, we’re not gonna get them out anyway, and that should
not be our priority.”69
In formal terms, the legal relief that ICE government lawyers offered at
this time was usually administrative closure—that is, the government would
decline to initiate removal proceedings against the noncitizen.70
Administrative closure did not create a pathway to regularizing status.71
Neither did it offer migrants employment-authorization documents, which
would open up access to the formal labor market.
Another frequent complaint lodged by immigrant advocates, especially
from the immigration bar, was the nature of the relief offered by prosecutorial
discretion.72 Even if a migrant caught up in the removal pipeline received a
favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the migrant would only be able
to receive administrative closure and not an opportunity to work.73 As one
official put it, “It wasn’t a good enough deal. They’d rather take their
chances on a cancellation claim or their asylum claim than they would with
some other claim they might have, you know, than they would accept
administrative closure.”74
During this period, the only type of administrative action that might be
characterized as relief was to identify those removable immigrants with
pending applications for relief with USCIS, which oversaw the family-based
green card petition process, among other programs. Georgia, a senior White
House official, confirmed that the enforcement-benefits distinction that is
often used to distinguish between ICE and USCIS was slightly overstated:
I mean USCIS seemed like the most logical agency . . . . This is not the
kind of thing that ICE does on a regular basis. And the idea was, you know
DACA is a law enforcement policy, it’s not a benefits policy. The idea is
that these folks should be out of the enforcement process and . . . allow ICE
to go after people who are priorities. So you know, let’s not bog them down
with implementing a program they have no expertise in. Let’s give it to the

69. Interview with Frank, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t (May 31, 2016) (transcript
on file with authors).
70. Lopez-Barrios, 20 I. & N. Dec. 203, 204 (B.I.A. 1990) (stating that administrative
closure “allows the removal of cases from the immigration judge’s calendar in certain
circumstances” but “does not result in a final order”).
71. Administratively closed cases from this period are now being reopened by DHS.
Hamed Aleaziz, The Trump Administration Is Seeking to Restart Thousands of Closed
Deportation
Cases,
BUZZFEED
NEWS
(Aug.
15,
2018,
9:45
PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/trump-deportations-immigration-icedhs-courts [https://perma.cc/Y7G4-U425].
72. See Corey Dade, Obama’s Deportation Policies Have Failed, Immigrant Advocates
Say, NPR (June 11, 2012, 6:36 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2012/06/
11/154782404/immigrant-advocates-obamas-deportation-policy-a-failure [https://perma.cc/
MP6M-B4HP].
73. See id. (quoting Crystal Williams, Executive Director of the American Immigration
Lawyers Association: “It’s putting your file on a shelf. That’s it. No other possibilities are
being offered, like the settlement of cases, adjustment of status.”).
74. Interview with Edgar, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t (May 26, 2016) (transcript
on file with authors) [hereinafter Interview 1 with Edgar].
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agency within DHS, which is also you know an agency that cares about
enforcement and does have enforcement as a part of their mandate . . . let’s
give it to them to implement it because we think they have the infrastructure
to actually pull it together.75

While ICE and USCIS are often understood to operate under separate
mandates and have separate types of workplace cultures, the two agencies
nevertheless coordinated their regulatory efforts in significant ways.
Things began to change on December 18, 2010, when the DREAM Act
failed to clear the Senate. Up until that point, the groups categorized as
nonpriorities remained fairly abstract and unformed. Usually, ICE fixated on
more generic types of equities that could qualify as “humanitarian” reasons
like illness, absence of criminal record, or being the parent of citizens.76 But
with this latest and very public congressional failure, the executive branch
began to focus more intently on how DHS enforcement policy could cobble
together some comparable form of relief for the Dreamer population.
While Dreamers are often associated with DACA, several interviewees
noted that in reality, DACA represents an extension of the prosecutorialdiscretion model that characterized the first part of the Obama
administration’s policy.77 In other words, the parameters that eventually
defined the contours of the DACA program were worked out during the
Morton memos years. Edgar, a senior advisor to the Secretary of Homeland
Security, noted that “the DACA story really has to begin much earlier
where . . . we were attempting to kind of shift ICE to focus on convicted
criminals . . . and so it began with that, and really, I think the DACA story
really begins in 2010 when we issued the civil enforcement priorities
memo.”78 When asked about when she first learned of the DACA program,
Georgia responded:
When did I first start to hear about it? I mean probably in . . . early 2010 I
would say? Maybe 2009? You know, . . . I guess actually because we
started working on the [prosecutorial discretion] memos. Yeah . . . I guess
late 2009, early 2010 . . . you know deferred action is not a new concept,
it’s been around for many years.79

Many senior officials cited pushback by career ICE officials as a
significant hurdle to successfully implementing the prosecutorial-discretion
75. Interview with Georgia, White House Staff (Nov. 17, 2017) (transcript on file with
authors).
76. Email from Arthur E. Adams on behalf of Mike P. Davis, Acting Dir., Office of the
Principal Legal Advisor, to Raphael Choi et al. (Nov. 3, 2010, 4:33 PM),
https://www.scribd.com/document/58810530/2011-ICE-Report-FOIA-request
[https://perma.cc/84NU-Q9TR] (email at pages 51–52). This email was released pursuant to
a FOIA request by the Houston Chronicle. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
77. We note here that there is strong incentive for those concerned with the legality of
DACA to emphasize its continuities with a conventional prosecutorial-discretion regime. But
as we argue below, we think that the discontinuities between the two approaches are important
and worth further evaluation in light of ongoing discussions about the role of the government
lawyer in serving the public interest. See infra Part II.
78. Interview 1 with Edgar, supra note 74.
79. Interview with Georgia, supra note 75.
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directives. Although ICE initiated a comprehensive review by lawyers in the
field of hundreds of thousands of deportation cases for administrative
closure, ultimately both frontline officers and agency leadership came to
resist more affirmative efforts to protect segments of the undocumented
population.80 According to Edgar, during President Obama’s first term, “ICE
at this time under [John Morton] generally took a very hard line and . . .
resisted everything.”81 This seemed to be a sentiment shared by those
working in the White House as well. Georgia noted:
2011 through 2012 was a really difficult time. . . . We had set up
priorities for how we wanted immigration enforcement to take place.
And, you know, our job was to set policy priorities, but I couldn’t be a
law enforcement agent all over the country. Neither could any of the
headquarters people at DHS, right? So, you know, it was the job of
local ICE officials, thousands of them across the country to be
executing on the policies we had put forward.82

Senior officials also fielded complaints from the immigrant-advocacy
community.83 A common complaint was that many immigrants with no or
minor criminal records were being swept up into the removal pipeline.84 In
this sense, some of the officials found the priorities to be less helpful in
sorting through the unauthorized-migrant pool. Although the putative focus
of the Morton memos was on those who posed a national security threat or a
danger to their communities, the memos also targeted recent immigration
violators.85 But, as Edgar explained:
[T]he third category was individuals who had reentered the country
unlawfully. Um, people who have been previously deported in some
fashion. You know, much later I realized what a problematic area that was
in the priorities. . . . [I]t was only after I, frankly, I got to ICE and had
access to a lot better data. Um that I was, you know, able to dig into their
data pretty deep realized that a substantial portion of the 11.5 million
[undocumented migrants in the United States] fell into that bucket.86

The large number of migrants in this category came to overwhelm the
process of identifying nonpriorities. According to Edgar, this helps explain
why immigrants and their advocates were not “feeling the change quick

80. See Interview 1 with Edgar, supra note 74.
81. Id.
82. Interview with Georgia, supra note 75.
83. According to our informants, senior officials at DHS met with representatives from
the American Immigration Lawyers’ Association and, later, United We Dream as they worked
on policy initiatives. See Interview with Frank, supra note 69.
84. See, e.g., Ken Dilanian, Tough Enforcement Against Illegal Immigrants Is Decried,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/21/nation/la-na-obamaimmigration-20100422 [https://perma.cc/P8GF-7WMV] (quoting Deepak Bhargava,
Executive Director of the Center for Community Change: “The president never said he was
going [to] end immigration enforcement, but he sent a clear signal that he would redirect it to
a focus on people with criminal records who are a threat to the country. That hasn’t
happened.”).
85. June 2010 Morton Memo, supra note 7, at 2.
86. Interview 1 with Edgar, supra note 74.
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enough.”87 As Edgar noted: “everyone’s searching for an answer as to
why . . . no one’s following the policies when—without realizing they are
following the policies.”88 The empirical data confirms this observation as
studies have shown the backlog to have steadily increased between 2007 and
2015.89
B. The “Beauty of Prosecutorial Discretion”
Senior leaders acknowledged that distrust characterized the relationship
between senior leadership and career officials: “And so, you know, if you
don’t have the trust and the buy-in, something of this nature is not going to
succeed, right? Cause ultimately it has to rise or fall in the field. And as
we’ve seen, there are pockets of pretty mass resistance.”90 According to
some officials, the distrust stemmed from a fundamental shift in how ICE
was meant to operate.91 Georgia stated:
The policies we were setting weren’t fully taking hold. . . . [A] part of that
is just, you know, it was a real shift in how an agency that was somewhat
new but had a history of being around for a while . . . it was a shift in how
they did business right? They were used to just saying whoever we run into
we’re gonna pick up. If . . . we think they’re undocumented or bad actors,
it doesn’t matter what their kind of equities are, right? So it was a shift in
kind of saying “no we don’t want you to just pick up everyone, we want
you to think about do these people really pose a threat to our communities?”
And you know that really took time to take hold.92

Some officials suggested that the notion of agency pushback was
overblown. Steve, who served in the DHS during Obama’s second term—
that is, well after the Morton memos era had passed—deflected criticisms
against ICE as a rogue agency:
[Y]ou know, there may have been people at ICE that were initially hesitant.
But you know, ICE followed orders. You didn’t see a lot of dissent, you
didn’t see a lot of leaking of information the way you do now . . . . [W]ere
they happy about everything? But also know they weren’t out there . . .

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Case Backlogs in Immigration Courts Expand, Resulting Wait Times Grow,
TRAC IMMIGR. (June 18, 2009), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/208/ [http://perma.cc/
T2TL-FTSK]; Immigration Courts: Actions Needed to Reduce Case Backlog and Address
Long-Standing Management and Operational Challenges, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.
(June 1, 2017), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-438 [https://perma.cc/6L8Q-K54A];
see also Suzy Khimm, Many Immigrants Facing Deportation Must Wait 550 Days for Their
Day in Court, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2013/02/22/many-immigrants-facing-deportation-must-wait-550-days-for-theirday-in-court/ [https://perma.cc/4G3F-8JCN].
90. Interview with Horace, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Oct. 11, 2016) (transcript on
file with authors).
91. See Stephen Lee, Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1089, 1118–
20 (2011).
92. Interview with Georgia, supra note 75.
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when people are really offended or running roughshod they go out there
and leak . . . that wasn’t happening either.93

David noted that the agency was heterogeneous and comprised of a variety
of views on the wisdom of whatever mandate senior leadership doled out.94
Still, he did not believe such disagreement ultimately mattered:
[A]ny law enforcement officer—federal, state or local—has their personal
opinions but they work in at least quasi-paramilitary organizations. And
when they are directed to do something, they do it. And their . . . personal
opinions don’t really matter. Ya know, I’m sure if you talked to certain
police officers in Colorado and said, “hey what’s your personal opinion
about legalizing marijuana,” some of them probably weren’t all that happy
about it. But they do what they have to do.95

Whether or not the characterization of ICE at this time as a “rogue agency”
is valid,96 what is clear is that the DHS leadership set about conducting
trainings around the country to close the gap separating senior leadership
from career officers. Senior leadership did this by visiting the various field
offices to expand on the mechanics of the prosecutorial-discretion system and
to address concerns. Central to this endeavor was the reconceptualization of
lawyers in the field in the model of federal prosecutors. The message
political appointees circulated was clear: that the power immigration lawyers
in the agency exercised was akin to the criminal law enforcement powers of
their DOJ counterparts.
Georgia noted that “there was a series of trainings that happened after all
the different policy memos that were put out.”97 She referred to these as
“town halls” where Secretary Napolitano and ICE Director John Morton
“would talk about various issues impacting the agencies, particularly
ICE. . . . And, you know really make a pitch that this is smart law
enforcement . . . this is the way to kind of do your job effectively.”98
Some senior officials plainly referenced the criminal law enforcement
model in explaining the pre-DACA years. When speaking with David about
the challenges of implementing the Morton memos priorities, he noted that
discretion was something that immigration officials could appropriately
exercise:
You can look at other examples where a . . . district attorney, umm, because
of work load, may make the decision that . . . we will no longer arrest
people for . . . possession of small amounts of marijuana. We’re gonna
issue a summons, something similar to a traffic citation. And local
jurisdictions and states . . . and even the federal government does that sort
93. Interview with Steve, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Feb. 26, 2018) (transcript on file
with authors).
94. Interview with David, supra note 66.
95. Id.
96. See Frank Sharry, ICE Out of Control: Time to Rein in Rogue Agency and Pass
Immigration Reform, HUFFINGTON POST (May 30, 2010), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
frank-sharry/ice-out-of-control-time-t_b_519201.html [https://perma.cc/B9CB-TH2L].
97. Interview with Georgia, supra note 75.
98. Id.
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of thing all the time. And you know, the officers charged with
implementing those decisions, they do. It doesn’t [necessarily] mean they
like it or support it . . . .99

Horace, a member of senior leadership in DHS overseeing the other agency
components, described it this way:
ICE’s infrastructure is more what you would imagine from a law
enforcement case management structure. You know, where like they have
things where they’re tracking like aspects of cases and individuals from like
a case perspective but that’s a lot different from like a benefits agency,
right, where there’s a lot more paper, or like whatever material, to justify a
thing.100

Another senior ICE official confirmed this account. Frank spent many
years working overseas on behalf of the federal government before joining
the leadership team in ICE.101 One of his duties was trying to translate the
Morton memos directives into meaningful change in the field offices. As he
described his role:
I pleaded with the administration, as did others . . . to try to change the
hearts and minds of many of those thousand attorneys, and to take a
different role . . . than they have previously had in some cases literally for
decades . . . in that they should not treat all cases alike, and that they should
focus their efforts . . . their talents, and their energy on truly high priority
cases, like terrorists and human rights violators, and murderers and rapists
and immigration frauds . . . and to . . . not spend as much time and perhaps
in some cases, not spend any time on visa overstays of individuals who had
come into the country as young people . . . or people that had frankly come
into the country later in life but had been good . . . civil citizens in a sense,
quotation marks around “citizens” . . . and had not committed crimes, and
had contributed to their communities and had paid their taxes.102

Journalists from the Houston Chronicle obtained documents from ICE’s
Houston field office.103 These documents include a variety of forms of
communications and cover a period of approximately six months, from June
2010 to January 2011.104 This was just a few months removed from the
March 2, 2011, Morton memo articulating the different enforcement
priorities and only a few weeks removed from the June 17, 2011, Morton
memo providing immigration officers with guidance on how to exercise
prosecutorial discretion.105 For this reason, the Houston field office

99. Interview with David, supra note 66.
100. Interview with Horace, supra note 90.
101. Interview with Frank, supra note 69.
102. Id.
103. See Carroll, supra note 19. The documents obtained through this FOIA request are
available at 2011 ICE Report/FOIA Request, SCRIBD, https://www.scribd.com/document/
58810530/2011-ICE-Report-FOIA-request [https://perma.cc/84NU-Q9TR] (last visited Mar.
15, 2019).
104. See 2011 ICE Report/FOIA Request, supra note 103.
105. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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documents provide a glimpse into how immigration bureaucrats responded
to directives issued by political appointees.
The Houston field office documents tend to confirm that ICE lawyers
viewed the Morton memos in terms of increasing efficiency in the office
rather than in terms of realizing equity-oriented outcomes. Agenda items for
meetings included titles such as “Improving the Efficiency of the Removal
Process:
Prosecutorial Discretion” with a focused examination of
administrative devices such as joint motions to reopen, appeals, and
remands.106 Leadership in the Houston office seemed to commit to the task
of changing office culture through the development of local implementation
policies and regularly held team meetings.107
The experience of the Houston office during this time suggests that local
offices struggled to find ways to translate the Morton memos’ dictates into
practice. In a memo to the attorneys in his office, Chief Counsel Gary
Goldman explained that the “universe of opportunities to exercise
prosecutorial discretion is large.”108 Goldman then continued to impress
upon the legal staff a particular vision of lawyering, one that reflects
traditional notions of prosecutorial power long associated with the criminal
context:
We have been empowered with independent authority to exercise
prosecutorial discretion. We work not in a world of black and white but
one of many shades of grey. That is the beauty of prosecutorial discretion.
...
ICE Senior Leadership does not want their attorneys to merely fill a
seat in immigration court and blindly prosecute every case handed to them.
The current administration wants attorneys of greater sophistication,
independence, and complexity in decision making.109

106. Working Agenda, Field Legal Operations Management Planning Session
(Aug. 2–3, 2010), https://www.scribd.com/document/58810530/2011-ICE-Report-FOIArequest [https://perma.cc/84NU-Q9TR] (agenda at pages 5–6).
107. See Email from Gary L. Goldman to Riah Ramlogan (Aug. 6, 2010, 5:36 PM),
https://www.scribd.com/document/58810530/2011-ICE-Report-FOIA-request
[https://perma.cc/84NU-Q9TR] (email at page 7).
108. Memorandum from Gary Goldman, Chief Counsel, Office of the Chief Counsel, U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enf’t to All Attorneys, Hous. Office of the Chief Counsel (Aug. 16,
2010),
https://www.scribd.com/document/58810530/2011-ICE-Report-FOIA-request
[https://perma.cc/84NU-Q9TR] (memorandum at pages 17–18). Goldman further observed:
It broadly encompasses NTA review, court litigation, not opposing relief, joining in
a Joint Motion, not appealing an adverse decision, etc. Further opportunities arise
at the appellate level with the extraordinary amount of work reaching the Board of
Immigration Appeals and the Circuit Court of Appeals. We also seek efficiencies
in the removal process through continuing dialogue with ERO, HSI, CIS, CBP, and
EOIR, through improved written advocacy, remands, etc.
Id.
109. Id. This memo was ultimately rescinded and replaced by one issued by central
leadership, but it still confirms that the message on the importance of prosecutorial sorting of
migrant send by political leaders like Edgar and Frank was received by those in at least one
field office. See August 2010 Morton Memo, supra note 64; see also Email from Gary L.
Goldman to Richard W. Bennett et al. (Aug. 24, 2010, 2:04 PM), https://www.scribd.com/

2019]

DACA AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

1897

More than anything, the model of government lawyering embraced by the
DHS during the pre-DACA years bears shades of a key assumption that
defines criminal law enforcement—namely, that the prosecutor is in the best
position to judge the merits and equities of a case.110 This was one of the
reasons some political appointees recoiled at the transition to the DACA
model: it wrested the power to decide who “deserved” removal from the
hands of immigration lawyers, modeled after prosecutors, and channeled that
power into the hands of bureaucrats in USCIS. David, the senior ICE official,
describes his reaction to the DACA program in terms of what is lost:
[T]he idea of prosecutorial discretion or deferred action is not something
uncommon in law enforcement. It’s common in law enforcement at every
level, but it more typically is applied to individuals on a case by case basis,
you know at the scene of the incident. You know, if two officers arrive at
a bar fight just off-campus, to put it in your world . . . you know they see
two people standing there kind of bloodied, and the prosecutorial discretion
process begins. They have to decide you know, are they going to arrest one
or both? What are they going to charge him with? They take him to some
sort of a, a magistrate that decides whether or not this is worth the court’s
time, whether or not there’s probable cause . . . are they going to detain
them, are they going to set bond? A state prosecutor is going to decide
whether or not to plea the case. You know all of that is prosecutorial
discretion. But it tends to be on a case by case basis. DACA was the first
of a series of policy decisions that took large numbers of people off the
enforcement table . . . rather than considering them on a case by case
basis.111

C. Infrastructure
As was widely reported in 2012, members of the White House met with
Dreamer advocates during the lead-up to the program’s announcement.112
The pressure was mounting and it was unfolding publicly. Not surprisingly,
on June 15, 2012, Secretary Napolitano issued a memorandum announcing
the creation of the DACA program.113
Many government officials acknowledged that these advocacy efforts
spurred on the DACA conversation within the White House. As Georgia
explained, “[T]here were more and more conversations we were having with
legal experts, you know outside of government . . . smart law professors
around the country who had also been looking more at it. Our White House
Counsel’s office as well. I think the work sped up in the spring of 2012.”114
document/58810530/2011-ICE-Report-FOIA-request [https://perma.cc/84NU-Q9TR] (email
at page 28).
110. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not
to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1657 (2010).
111. Interview with David, supra note 66.
112. See Miriam Jordan, Anatomy of a Deferred-Action Dream, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 14,
2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443982904578046951916986168
[https://perma.cc/HP8N-VHXU].
113. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
114. Interview with Georgia, supra note 75.
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A less well-known part of the story had to do with the conversations taking
place among DHS senior leadership. These conversations seemed to be
taking place independent of the ones unfolding within the White House.
Even though these discussions were happening independent of one another,
both the White House and the DHS ended up pretty much in the same place.
Georgia observed that “we were all kind of going in the same direction
anyway.”115
The creation of DACA represented a reallocation of authority away from
ICE to USCIS. Implementing the vision of the Morton memos conflicted
with agency culture. As Horace, a former senior DHS official, observed:
“[I]f you don’t have the trust and the buy-in, something of this nature is not
going to succeed, right? Cause ultimately it has to rise or fall in the field.
And as we’ve seen, there are pockets of pretty mass resistance.”116 Isaac,
another senior DHS official who served the administration during the same
period, explained that the struggle to implement that vision “had to do with
the leadership that was put in place at ICE and, you know, just a culture of,
you know, ‘Hands off, we’re law enforcement, we do what we want.’”117 In
turning to USCIS, the challenge was no longer one of culture but rather of
infrastructure.
USCIS had experience with handling and overseeing the benefits
program.118 At the same time, DACA was a massive undertaking. And
USCIS needed to build a system to handle the flood of applications that
DACA would generate. As Horace, a senior DHS official, observed:
So, you know, USCIS, as you probably know, has . . . very old
infrastructure and by infrastructure, I merely mean sort of the computer
systems that they have to process and the various associated sort of support
services they have there, you know, for a long time, you know, as of many
things relating to benefits, an application was done totally on paper.119

In the end, USCIS modified an application it had been using to process
applications for Temporary Protected Status.120
As was the case with prosecutorial nonenforcement decisions in ICE,
denials of DACA applications within USCIS were exercises of discretion.
And as is the case with almost all discretionary agency decisions, denials are
not reviewable by federal courts.121 Still, USCIS did provide a rough
approximation of a review process through its ombudsman office. Those
115. Id.
116. Interview with Horace, supra note 90.
117. Interview with Isaac, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Oct. 13, 2016) (transcript on file
with authors).
118. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
119. Interview with Horace, supra note 90.
120. The TPS form is recorded as an I-821 form, while the DACA form is I-821D. See I821, Application for Temporary Protected Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES,
https://www.uscis.gov/i-821 [https://perma.cc/45AF-6CX5] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019);
I-821D, Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/i-821d [https://perma.cc/K2PZ-LZNN] (last visited
Mar. 15, 2019).
121. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (2012).
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working within the ombudsman office did not have the authority to reverse
findings by USCIS adjudicators, but if an applicant disagreed with a
disposition, she could request that the ombudsman office inquire about the
process.122 In a report issued by the ombudsman office in 2013—the year
after DACA went into effect—the ombudsman identified “transparency and
consistency for individuals requesting deferred action” as a key goal for its
office.123
Some who worked within the ombudsman office thought that USCIS faced
serious challenges in implementing DACA. Felicia worked in this office
during the Obama administration.124 A lawyer by training, she came to
USCIS from the nonprofit sector, where she had helped provide legal
services to immigrant communities.125 When asked about the types of
problems her office addressed, Felicia noted:
In the most recent round of renewals, the agency system had a glitch that
caused background checks to . . . fall out of the queue. . . . They were
serious enough that it posed grave delays, and the agency wasn’t very
straightforward about it. At all. Not with the community, not with the
Congress, or with our office.126

Although many depictions of DACA—both judicial127 and popular128—
portrayed it as an opportunity for agency officials to rubber-stamp
applications, Felicia provided a more nuanced description of this picture. She
confirmed the suspicion harbored by many immigrant-rights activists that
contact with law enforcement, even minimal contact, could be the basis for
exclusion from the program.129 Again, here is Felicia:
I recall seeing cases . . . where we felt the person met the requirement but
USCIS disagreed. . . . [W]e went back and forth on several cases that
presented adjudications issues. . . . [A]nd it was really hard for us to push
those . . . in which there had been a criminal arrest. Even if we felt that the
underlying offense . . . disqualified the individual for DACA, I think the
agency, you know the officers who . . . had the strictest, I think the most
restrictive position on some of these cases . . . they were very sensitive to
congressional inquiries about DACA recipients with criminal backgrounds.

122. Ombudsman—Case Assistance, supra note 44.
123. See OMBUDSMAN, CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ANNUAL REPORT 2013, at viii
(2013), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CISOMB_2013_Annual_Report
%20508%20final.pdf [https://perma.cc/92F9-9DCQ].
124. Interview with Felicia, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. (Dec. 1, 2017)
(transcript on file with authors).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided
court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.).
128. See Jessica M. Vaughan, Dir. of Policy Studies, Ctr. for Immigration Studies,
Statement to the U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 3, 2017),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/10-03-17%20Vaughan%20Testimony.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GN75-4S4M].
129. Interview with Felicia, supra note 124.
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Or criminal arrest[s], rather. So I think it was nearly impossible for us to
move any of those cases.130

D. Information Markets
As legal scholars have noted, the move toward a DACA model for
discretionary relief signaled the embrace of transparency as a mode of
governance.131 But abandoning the “black box” of the prosecutorial
model132 in favor of an open and transparent model for relief presented new
regulatory challenges. Because deferral could not be granted until and unless
noncitizens affirmatively applied for such relief, USCIS officials focused
their attention on ensuring that information on the content and parameters of
the program were as accurate as possible.
Carl worked closely with the USCIS director during the DACA rollout.133
He noted that after the program was announced in June 2012, but before
USCIS began accepting applications, agency officials were reluctant to “go
out with even a little bit of piecemeal stuff here and there” for fear of
generating “confusion among advocacy groups or service organizations.”134
To the extent USCIS communicated with the public, Carl noted, “The
message was, yes, we are working towards this, [but] don’t prepare anything,
don’t give notarios anything. We are the official source. We will give things
out on or about August 15.”135
Adam Cox and Cristina Rodríguez have noted that one process-based
shortcoming of DACA was its lack of public input, something that could have
inevitably improved and legitimated the program.136 Bert worked as a senior
legal advisor in the Obama administration after DACA had already been
created.137 He made a similar point about the administration’s decision not
to create DACA through notice-and-comment procedures, which is how
significant policies are typically created:
I was surprised they didn’t use notice and comment. Not because I thought
it was clear that they had to, because it was pretty clear that someone would
challenge them on this ground, and why leave ourselves vulnerable to that
possible lawsuit? It probably would have delayed things about a year, but
at the time they had the year. And to this day I scratch my head and think
why they didn’t do it.138

130. Id.
131. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 9, at 197–205.
132. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 129
(2008) (describing prosecutorial decision-making as a “black box” due to a lack of regulation
compelling transparency).
133. Interview with Carl, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. (Apr. 28, 2016) (transcript
on file with authors).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 9, at 217–18.
137. Interview with Bert, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. (Apr. 4, 2016) (transcript
on file with authors).
138. Id.
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Our interview data shows that many officials did engage stakeholders and
other constituents even if it was not through channels prescribed by the
Administrative Procedure Act. In this way, DACA created a sort of
information economy in which entities like agencies, nonprofit immigrantserving organizations, and for-profit notarios could establish value in (or in
the case of notarios, defraud and potentially ruin) the lives of immigrants
with information about a program drafted by Secretary Janet Napolitano and
announced by President Obama in the Rose Garden.
USCIS officials also evinced a sensitivity to norms governing the various
noncitizen communities. Gaia, who advised USCIS officials as a lawyer and
counselor, noted that a challenge throughout the DACA rollout was
convincing eligible Asian American noncitizens to apply.139 She explained:
“We kept hearing a culture of shame from [Asian Pacific American] groups.
People were less inclined to come out with that status because of shame.
Didn’t see that with various Latino groups. For them, it was more about
fear.”140 The empirical data seems to confirm this basic trend. According to
the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), the DACA participation rate for people
of Mexican origin is 68 percent while the highest participation rate among
Asian Americans belongs to South Koreans at 24 percent.141 Chinese
application rates are even lower. Despite comprising the largest subgroup of
the Asian American community, the participation rate of Chinese Americans
is only 3 percent.142 Other studies largely confirm this basic pattern.143
Trained as a lawyer, Serena also worked within USCIS.144 A child of
Korean immigrants, she advised USCIS leadership on a variety of legal and
policy-related matters.145 In discussing the role that she and other senior
leadership played in the DACA rollout, Serena explained that it went beyond
139. Interview with Gaia, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. (Mar. 28, 2016)
(transcript on file with authors).
140. Id.
141. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Data Tools, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.,
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/deferred-action-childhood-arrivalsdaca-profiles [https://perma.cc/YSX5-MJU8] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
142. Id.
143. The Brookings Institution obtained data on DACA through a FOIA request. It found
that Mexican applicants comprised 74.9 percent of all DACA applications and South Koreans
consisted of 1.5 percent of the total applicant pool. See Nicole Prchal Svajlenka & Audrey
Singer, Immigration Facts: Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), BROOKINGS
(Aug. 14, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/research/immigration-facts-deferred-action-forchildhood-arrivals-daca/ [https://perma.cc/UB85-8H2E]. Another study that relies on the
Brookings data and that focuses specifically on Asian Americans records the DACA
application rates of Koreans at 35 percent and Chinese at 5 percent. See EunSook Lee,
Increasing Asian American and Pacific Islander DACA Participation: Overview and
Grantmaking Recommendations, GCIR tbl.C (Apr. 2014), https://web.archive.org/web/
20150922014347/https://www.gcir.org/sites/default/files/resources/AAPI%20DACA%20Su
mmary%20Brief%20Design.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZN5S-VA8Z]. One possible explanation
for the difference in rates between the Brookings and Lee studies on the one hand and the MPI
study on the other is the dataset. The former relied on DACA rates through 2013 while the
latter reflects data through August 2018.
144. Interview with Serena, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (May 23, 2018) (transcript on file with
authors).
145. Id.

1902

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

merely conveying information to the public. She said that oftentimes, it felt
as if she urged and prodded stakeholders to engage the process, to agitate
those in power: “There were times when I would reach out to the Asian
Americans groups and say ‘You guys need to show up. I need you to, like,
stomp your feet, like you know, be a bigger voice.’”146
III. THE ETHICAL DISCRETION OF IMMIGRATION LAWYERS
IN THE GOVERNMENT
The delegation of authority to and away from an agency in a given matter
strongly shapes how ambiguities will be resolved and the speed with which
those resolutions will come.147 But the relationship between the location of
authority, the regulatory outcomes, and the external political environment
also informs the construction of the duties owed by lawyers.
A. Normative Innocence
Immigration enforcement policy during the Obama administration
borrowed freely from the prosecutorial model associated with the criminal
law tradition. Gail, a high-ranking DHS official, described ICE officers as
“immigration cops,”148 which is consistent with the messaging that OPLA
lawyers received—that they occupied roles similar to prosecutors in the
criminal legal system. Prior to working in the administration, Gail spent
several years as a federal prosecutor.149 She justified DACA precisely on
these terms: “[T]he sanction in immigration enforcement, deportation . . .
ha[s] significant consequences on a person’s life. And although it’s
civil/administrative, it’s kind of quasi-criminal. And even in administrative
law there’s the concept of prosecutorial discretion.”150 At the same time, we
should have a clear picture of what exactly is being borrowed.
The reality is that discretion in this context tries to serve many different
purposes. A prosecutor may decline to charge a defendant because the
underlying proof is weak (legal reasons), because of limited resources
(administrative reasons), or because it would not be fair to do so (equitable
reasons).151 DACA was justified on all of these grounds. And the message
was clear: just as prosecutors enjoy freedom from judicial interference in the
realm of charging discretion,152 so should immigration officials enjoy similar
146. Id.
147. See Ming H. Chen, Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit: Bureaucratic
Politics in Federal Workplace Agencies Serving Undocumented Workers, 33 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 227, 245–46 (2012); see also Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency
Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1134–35 (2012).
148. See Interview with Gail, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (June 17, 2016) (transcript on file
with authors).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See Bowers, supra note 110, at 1656–57.
152. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); Kate Stith, The Arc of the
Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1422–
23 (2008).
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degrees of autonomy. Some of the opposition to DACA was certainly
political disagreements masquerading as procedural objections.153 But some
of it might also be the difficulties of asking any prosecutorial entity to impose
sanctions for reasons of mercy or normative innocence—that is, when one
has formally violated the law but not violated broader moral codes.
Josh Bowers, for example, argues that there are many reasons to doubt that
prosecutors are necessarily better situated than other actors in the criminal
legal system to evaluate whether or not charging a particular defendant would
be fair, including the difficulty of obtaining relevant facts in arrest records.154
Prosecutors rely on police to gather the underlying facts, and even if
prosecutors are inclined to exercise equitable discretion, the police will not
necessarily share that sentiment, which makes it hard to determine whether a
particular defendant fits the types of “normatively innocent” person entitled
to relief.155 This institutional reality helps explain why OPLA attorneys
might have felt resentment toward the creation of DACA. That program was
popularly understood as a repudiation of ICE as a whole, but from the
vantage point of OPLA attorneys, they were being penalized for the
shortcomings of Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO), the branch of
the agency that plays the role of the police to OPLA’s prosecutors. This is
consistent with the view shared by senior DHS and ICE officials: that OPLA
attorneys followed orders but that perhaps they were not in the best position
to evaluate normatively innocent migrants because the underlying files may
not have been properly prepared by ERO with that goal in mind.
Even if ICE could obtain buy-in from both the prosecutorial and
investigatory arms of its agency, the exercise of equitable discretion along
these lines would still pose challenges to modern administrative norms and
practice. Generally speaking, administrative law has developed in a manner
that seeks to minimize unfettered discretion exercised by government
officials. As Rachel Barkow points out, “In a legal culture that is firmly
committed to judicial review, wedded to reasoned decisionmaking, and
devoted to a fair and regular process, there is little space for the exercise of
unreviewable legal power that is dispensed without reason and without the
need to be consistent.”156
The interview with Edgar reflects the sort of discomfort and disconnect of
incorporating principles of mercy into the immigration realm. The interview
spanned two separate sessions. In the first interview, Edgar described the
process of issuing the Morton memos this way:
I—I don’t think people were feeling the change quick enough, and . . . we
had talked about it when we established the simple enforcement priorities
that we would also revise and issue a new policy on prosecutorial

153. See Ming H. Chen, Beyond Legality: The Legitimacy of Executive Action in
Immigration Law, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87, 119 (2016).
154. Bowers, supra note 110, at 1701.
155. See id.
156. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of
Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1339 (2008).
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discretion. You know, . . . who are you gonna, you know, show some, you
know, for lack of a better word, you know, mercy towards.157

He mentioned mercy reluctantly, almost in passing. In the second
interview with Edgar, upon revisiting the topic of mercy, he expressed much
greater resistance to that characterization. Here is the exchange:
STEPHEN LEE: Like I’m trying to figure out how much, how much
of the program was just about like a, you know, sorting from the
institutional perspective to make sure you could highlight the priorities
and . . . help use resources, and how much of it was sort of seen as like a—
almost like a clemency, uh, akin to that kind of procedure.
EDGAR: Uh, clemency I don’t even think is the right word, and I don’t
like the mercy word, that’s a really weird word for me to use. . . . Um, but
it’s more like this; I think it was like, well, this is the right thing to do. We
shouldn’t waste any resources on these people, right?158

After explaining the various benefits that Dreamers could obtain through
DACA, Edgar continued:
You know, um, this is a population that shouldn’t be touched. There was a
lot of that, so that I wouldn’t say mercy is the right word. It’s not like,
okay, we’re going to show compassion to this population, I mean but it was
more like, hey, this is a population that this country shouldn’t waste any
money or time deporting. I mean this was the kind of mindset we had,
right? And we should just—shouldn’t waste time or money on this—
energy on this population, and this is the best way to take care of it, so we’re
going to do it.
Um, I, I don’t think we were looking at it like a—I mean I think here
was . . . certainly some sympathy for the situation these people find
themselves in. There was a lot of sympathy, right? These—I think we—
that’s reflected in the [DACA] memo.159

Edgar then concluded by reiterating that it was the right thing to do: “And
there was a real strong conviction that this was the right thing to do, both
from a . . . moral or just an ideal policy perspective but also . . . an
enforcement perspective.”160 Not all of our interview subjects expressed
ambivalence about the equitable strains of DACA. Many fully embraced it
while others simply did not acknowledge it during the course of being
interviewed. But Edgar’s struggle to land on a firm position on DACA’s
equitable dimensions reflects the difficulty of fitting nearly unfettered
discretionary decision-making within the modern administrative state.
Immigration scholars have defended the DACA program as a
constitutionally permissible expression of the president’s duties to “take
Care” that the laws be faithfully executed.161 These types of arguments have
157. Interview 1 with Edgar, supra note 74.
158. Interview with Edgar, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t (Sept. 14, 2016) (transcript
on file with authors).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See generally Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Response: The Obama Administration, in
Defense of DACA, Deferred Action, and the DREAM Act, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 59 (2012).
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tended to amount to a broader defense of the president’s ability to preserve
resources and set priorities. Focusing on the normative innocence of DACA
beneficiaries highlights another executive power also memorialized in the
Constitution, namely the power to pardon and to grant clemency.162
Presidents can exercise this power in a systematic fashion, which provides
the president with a “bully pulpit” to persuade Congress and the public that
legislation should be changed.163 In many ways, DACA did precisely that.
DACA’s content was derived entirely from the DREAM Act, a failed
legislative action, which sent a strong signal of the president’s
disappointment with the failure to pass the bill. But because DACA was
presented as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion grounded in the logic of
resource allocation and the centralization of authority, the moral dimensions
of the program did not figure easily or readily into public justifications for
the program. DACA as an act of clemency points to an alternative reality in
which the program operated as a moral disagreement with an immigration
system created by Congress that deprived childhood arrivals of any
meaningful attempt to adjust their status.
Viewing DACA through the lens of clemency also forces the question of
accountability. Professor Barkow observes:
Because the clemency decision is squarely placed with the President,
it is a decision for which he or she is plainly accountable. Executive
discretion not to bring charges could rest anywhere down the chain of
command, including a law enforcement officer’s decision not to arrest or
investigate, or a line prosecutor’s decision not to bring charges. Unlike the
President, those individuals are neither elected nor directly democratically
accountable.164

This observation pairs with the view from within the Obama administration
that DACA offered the country a big and daring governmental program. In
a candid moment, Edgar bluntly stated the motivation for moving away from
the prosecutorial-discretion model toward DACA: “I think a lot of our
internal reflection was boy everything we’ve done has been half measures—
everything’s been compromises, you know with ICE. Well maybe we should
just say fuck the compromises, you know, and just get something done.”165
While DACA certainly moves past the “half measure” of a Morton memos
regime, the clemency frame suggests that DACA itself was a kind of hedge.
It reflected a discretionary decision that avoided the moral implications of an
immigration code that created the pool of childhood arrivals in the first place.

162. See U.S. CONST., art II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President . . . shall have Power to Grant
Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of
Impeachment.”).
163. See Charles Shanor & Marc Miller, Pardon Us: Systematic Presidential Pardons, 14
FED. SENT’G REP. 139, 139 (2001).
164. See Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal Law,
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 839 (2015).
165. Interview 1 with Edgar, supra note 74.
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As Peter Markowitz and Lindsay Nash argue, the president has the power
to pardon noncitizens for their immigration offenses.166 A clemency version
of DACA could have offered noncitizens the same terms for relief but would
have proceeded in a different form. The name of the president, and not the
Secretary of Homeland Security, would be on the issuing document. In the
version of DACA that we know, government lawyers advised Secretary
Napolitano and grounded the program in cornerstone administrative law
decisions like Heckler v. Chaney,167 which discouraged judges from
scrutinizing too heavily the nonenforcement decisions of agencies. In the
clemency version of DACA, government lawyers can do even less because
the nature of pardoning is political—the rewards and penalties are issued in
the arena of political elections.
As for that version of DACA, Georgia intimated that the president was
reluctant to use his bully pulpit too aggressively, at least on that issue. As
she explained:
[T]he impact [DACA] would have on the legislative debate is also
something we talked about. People wanted us to do DACA immediately
after the DREAM Act failed in 2010, and I think the President was still not
ready to go there. And you know, a part of it was that he knew it was going
to have an impact on the debate. It could have a positive impact in
jumpstarting the conversation, . . . or it could have a negative impact. We
weren’t certain umm the impact it was gonna have. In our case an election
was also happening, so when we did announce it . . . the kind of excitement
around DACA, combined with you know the outcome of the election
actually did jumpstart the debate again in 2013.168

In the end, it is tempting to conclude that policies taking power away from
frontline lawyers and giving it to high-level advisors means that government
lawyers should not effectuate policies grounded in views of normative
innocence. The mixed and at times jumbled justifications for DACA
suggests this to be the case. But it also seems true that these sorts of executive
actions could be squarely based on equitable considerations like normative
innocence or mercy so long as the president himself—and not frontline
officers or even his political appointee surrogates—was willing to bear the
political cost for doing so.
B. Persistent Moral Engagement
Scholars argue that lawyers acting in an advisory capacity to political
actors at the upper echelons of the executive branch are obligated to
incorporate principles of independence and candid advice-giving in their

166. See generally Peter L. Markowitz & Lindsay Nash, Pardoning Immigrants, 93 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 58 (2018).
167. 470 U.S. 821 (1984).
168. Interview with Georgia, supra note 75.
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work.169 They have a greater duty to the public interest,170 implicitly due to
the weight of authority that they bear, whereas lawyers acting in an advocacy
capacity, particularly those who represent agencies in litigation, arguably
have a greater duty to carry out that agency’s imperatives as defined by
supervisors and the political appointees to whom they report.171 Scholars
have forcefully argued that lawyers in the latter category do not possess
ethical discretion with regard to their own conceptions of the public interest
and are duty-bound to take orders and implement policies.172 In this section,
we explore how the foundational dichotomy in the government-lawyering
literature—public interest versus agency imperative—both holds up and
comes apart in the context of the immigration initiatives discussed above.
These conceptions contextualize the Morton memos and DACA, even as the
facts from these policy narratives test the continuing vitality of the ideas that
shape the ethical practice of government lawyering.
Judge Patricia Wald called the public interest the “phantom client” of the
government lawyer.173 It is almost a truism that government lawyers—
among multiple other duties—are charged with advancing the public interest:
A government lawyer serves the interests of many different entities: his
supervisor in the department or agency, the agency itself, the statutory
mission of the agency, the entire government of which that agency is a part,
and the public interest. . . . The government attorney’s duty is not to a client
but to the set of institutions through which society is governed and the
public interest is pursued.174

But the idea is tested by the various contexts in which government lawyers
practice. They perform widely varied functions with differing levels of
authority for their practices.175 This is the case for the immigration lawyers
serving the state. As described above, lawyers like Georgia advise the
president in the White House, while Edgar serves the Secretary of Homeland
Security, David provides counsel to principals in ICE, and frontline attorneys
represent the government in adversarial deportation proceedings overseen by
169. See David Luban, The Moral Complexity of Cause Lawyers Within the State, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 705, 712 (2012).
170. See Norman W. Spaulding, Professional Independence in the Office of the Attorney
General, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1931, 1970–71 (2008).
171. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and
Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293, 1294–97 (1987).
172. See id. at 1294.
173. Patricia M. Wald, “For the United States”: Government Lawyers in Court, 61 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 128 (1998) (“Strong advocacy by government lawyers of their
agency clients is to be desired, but most judges want the government lawyer to consider the
‘public interest,’ ephemeral as that is, to be his phantom client as well.”).
174. See Developments in the Law—Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 1244, 1414–15 (1981).
175. See id. at 1417 (“The government attorney himself is a mythical being. The federal
district judge, his law clerk, the Federal Trade Commission hearing officer, the General
Counsel of the Army, the state attorney general, and the local prosecutor and city attorney may
all be characterized as ‘government attorneys,’ in that they belong to the bar and work for the
government. Yet these individuals perform a variety of very different tasks, including
investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and general policymaking.”).
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DOJ lawyers in their role as administrative adjudicators.176 The capacity of
these attorneys to exercise independence and to act on their understanding of
the public interest varies widely depending on their position in the agency
hierarchy, their proximity to political figures with authority, and their
function, whether advisory or advocacy.
This challenge is exacerbated when an agency acts on controversial subject
matter. Indeed, foundational to the public-choice critiques of the public
interest, such as by Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, is the contention
that a common good cannot be discerned and acted upon:
[T]he constitutional system of checks and balances depends upon the
institutional loyalty of its attorneys. Although this argument runs counter
to the common intuition that the government attorney should act to further
the common good, we argue that this common view is ultimately
insupportable, in large part because there is simply no consensus in our
pluralistic society as to what constitutes the common good.177

In the immigration context, there are sharply contested views about what
the state should do with regard to undocumented people in the United States.
Macey and Miller would likely point to the immigration example as a prime
case study arguing against the pursuit of the public interest in government
lawyering. In their conception, politics is a market in which individual
interests compete for primacy.178 Government lawyers must remain careful
to either work on behalf of the winning ideas, or on behalf of elected leaders,
and to refrain from advancing their own vision of the common good through
their work.179 When government lawyers act with a degree of independence
from political authorities they are understood to be in danger of substituting
their own individual beliefs for government policy.180 In the rhetorical
structure suggested by William Simon, the choice that is constructed is
between legitimate, libertarian, client-centered “legal” ends versus
illegitimate, inchoate, “moral” ends.181
176. See supra notes 68, 75, 78 and accompanying text.
177. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reflections on Professional Responsibility
in a Regulatory State, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (1995).
178. See id. at 1108.
179. See id. at 1106.
180. See Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer as Whistleblower: Confidentiality and the
Government Lawyer, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 299 (“The underlying problem in the public
interest approach derives from the government lawyer’s discretion to fashion a personal and
subjective notion of the public good.”).
181. Critics, such as William Simon, pointed to the constraints imposed by the terms of
engagement:
Although critics of conventional legal ethics discourse often adopt the law versus
morality characterization, its strongest influence is to bias discussion in favor of
conventional, especially libertarian, responses. Typically the conventional response
is portrayed as the “legal” one; the unconventional response is portrayed as a
“moral” alternative. This rhetoric connotes that the “legal” option is objective and
integral to the professional role, whereas the “moral” alternative is subjective and
peripheral. Even when the rhetoric expresses respect for the “moral” alternative, it
implies that the lawyer who adopts it is on her own and vulnerable both intellectually
and practically. The usual effect is to make it psychologically harder for lawyers
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There is dissensus in every policy arena, even those understood to rely
upon a common moral code, as in the case of torture.182 Indeed, there are
political interests in the United States that benefit from dissensus even in the
face of established facts. A public-choice approach to government
lawyering, combined with manufactured dissensus, leads to winner-take-all
politics in which elected officials are motivated to mobilize the state in favor
of their narrow political interests, as appears to be occurring currently. And
government lawyers engaged in prosecutorial functions have been largely
freed of limits that might be imposed by ethical norms, as they have pursued
the agency imperatives of a carceral state.183 DACA presents an example of
government lawyers acting in advisory roles and counseling their principals
to implement policy in contravention of applicable law with some underlying
notion of a public interest at stake. Even in the muddled policy justifications
for DACA delineated in the preceding section, government lawyers
reluctantly embraced equity-based rationales that aligned with the direction
ultimately given to them by the White House. The dichotomy between public
interest and agency imperative comes apart in this instance. Government
lawyers appear to have a degree of moral engagement in the midst of policy
dissensus both outside and within the state.
C. Constructing the Public Interest
DACA may help us understand with greater clarity how the public interest
is constructed in government lawyering. The pre-DACA years of DHS
immigration enforcement provide greater texture to ongoing discussions
about how power is and should be allocated within the executive branch. A
group of administrative law scholars have shined a light on an “internal
separation of powers.”184 These principles and legal mechanisms help create
rivalries within the executive branch akin to traditional notions of separation
of powers, which govern the federal government generally and for the same
purpose: to reduce the consolidation of power in one faction thereby
guarding against tyrannical rule.185

and law students to argue for the “moral” alternative. In many such situations,
however, both alternatives could readily be portrayed as competing legal values.
The specious law-versus-morality characterization is used most frequently to
privilege client loyalty.
William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1114 (1988).
182. See generally Jesselyn Radack, Tortured Legal Ethics: The Role of the Government
Advisor in the War on Terrorism, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2006).
183. See Marie Gottschalk, Bring It On: The Future of Penal Reform, the Carceral State,
and American Politics, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 559, 559–60 (2015).
184. See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s
Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006); Elizabeth Magill & Adrian
Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032 (2011); Jon D. Michaels,
An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515 (2015) [hereinafter
Michaels, Enduring]; Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals:
An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227 (2016).
185. Michaels, Enduring, supra note 184, at 520.
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In terms of accountability, internal separation of powers became more
important as the Obama administration transitioned from the first term to the
second. In describing DACA, Horace observed that “[i]t was also really
important . . . from a policy perspective that the program be essentially selffunded.”186 As the DHS utilized DACA as a mechanism for protecting
Dreamers, agency decisions became even more insulated against
congressional oversight given that the program was self-funded. This stands
in stark contrast to the prosecutorial-discretion model in which Congress
could dial down DHS funding through the appropriations process. But
allowing otherwise removable immigrants to apply for deferred-action status
enabled USCIS to collect fees, which effectively kept the program afloat and
more importantly insulated against congressional intervention through the
funding process.187
This dynamic within the Obama administration illustrates two points that
once again complicate the public-interest versus agency-imperative
dichotomy. First, frontline lawyers and officers in ICE may have been
pursuing what they perceived to be the public interest, as defined by laws on
the books and congressional opposition to changes to those laws.188
Relatedly, the public interest is defined down in the face of difficult social
challenges, such as migration and economic dislocation. The state begins to
define success through quantitative performance measures.189 In Mary Fan’s
words, “the system slides into staging impressive displays of power rather
than doing the hard job of aiming for effective strategy.”190
Second, when frontline lawyers feel political or personal affinity with
enforcement agents, there is potential for pervasive individual or institutional
conflicts.191 When OPLA attorneys saw their office (or the authority of their
186. Interview with Horace, supra note 90.
187. See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Fee Schedule, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,292,
73,331 (Oct. 24, 2016) (listing the application fee for temporary protected status as $50); see
also Our Fees, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/forms/our-fees
[https://perma.cc/CYC3-UGBK] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019) (“USCIS is almost entirely
funded by application and petition fees.”).
188. See Macey & Miller, supra note 177, at 1116 (“To the extent that government
attorneys clash within the agency itself, however, there is a potential for the government
attorney to advance his own interests at the expense of the agency as a whole.”). But as Miller
argues:
In a system of checks and balances it is not the responsibility of an agency attorney
to represent the interests of Congress or the Court. . . . [T]he constitutional system
presumes—indeed, depends upon—the institutional loyalty of its lawyers.
Congress has manifold opportunities—including powers of purse, oversight,
investigation, and impeachment—to punish presidents or cabinet officers who do
not administer the law to its liking. It does not need the allegiance of agency
attorneys to fulfill its constitutional functions.
Miller, supra note 171, at 1296.
189. See Mary De Ming Fan, Disciplining Criminal Justice: The Peril amid the Promise
of Numbers, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 27–56 (2007) (describing incentives in federal
criminal prosecution in favor of numerical targets over fairness).
190. Id. at 28.
191. Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of Interest, 58
B.C. L. REV. 463, 473 (2017) (“Pervasive individual conflicts arise out of commonly shared
personal interests that may influence the decision-making of all prosecutors in an office.

2019]

DACA AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

1911

office)192 or ICE enforcement agents as their client, conflicts arose when the
leadership to whom they report sought to move the agency against those
preferences.193 Interestingly, this happened to a degree even when leadership
sought to endow ICE attorneys with greater prosecutorial discretion. While
leadership saw the Morton memos as authority-enhancing, the substantive
end of the administrative closure of thousands of deportation cases cut
against frontline policy preferences. Immigration prosecutors in ICE
refrained from exercising their discretion. In contrast, lawyers in advisory
functions relied, at least in part, on a conception of the public interest.
The scholarly debate over public fiduciary theory may help us understand
how government lawyers may define the public interest.194 Evan J. Criddle
and Evan Fox-Decent argue that government lawyers have “first order”
duties to their putative clients and “second order” duties to a broader
conception of the public interest.195 Seth Davis warns against an investment
in the legitimation of a fiduciary government, a conception repeatedly used
by colonial regimes to oppress and harm indigenous peoples.196 The
government deploys discretionary power over private parties and displaces
their agency. Davis’s warning is particularly apropos in this case because of
the vulnerability of undocumented people, like American Indians, to the
plenary power of the federal government.
In the case of DACA, social movement organizations mobilized against
the immigration enforcement practices of the Obama administration with
particular vigor after the failure of the DREAM Act in 2010. Social
Institutional conflicts arise from the prosecutor’s connection to the prosecutorial office as an
institution rather than from any personal interest or relationship to another party.”). More
directly, police hold bargaining power over prosecutors. Note, The Paradox of “Progressive
Prosecution,” 132 HARV. L. REV. 748, 763–64 (2018) (“Prosecutors’ offices are reliant on the
police to provide the essential service of detection of crimes. This reliance gives the police
bargaining power over prosecutors, and when prosecutors act in ways the police disapprove
of, police can voice that disapproval by withholding their services from prosecutors in the
future.”).
192. Macey & Miller, supra note 177, at 1119 (“[G]overnment attorneys will seek to
expand their power within an agency at the expense of the agency, or to expand the power of
the agency at the expense of society.”).
193. See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 394–95 (1937); Cox &
Rodríguez, supra note 9, at 151–73 (describing the “two-principals” model in immigration
law, where agencies report to both the legislative and executive branches); Michael C. Jensen
& William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308, 330 (1976); Note, supra note 191, at 760–61
(explaining agency costs in criminal prosecutors’ offices).
194. See generally FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT (Evan J. Criddle, Evan Fox-Decent, Andrew
S. Gold, Sung Hui Kim & Paul D. Miller eds., 2018).
195. See generally Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular
Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441 (2010) (discussing democratic
accountability of public agencies through means other than the “proxy representation” of
elected officials); Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, Guardians of Legal Order: The Dual
Commissions of Public Fiduciaries, in FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT, supra note 194, at 67.
196. Seth Davis, Pluralism and the Public Trust, in FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT, supra note
194, at 281, 282 (“Fiduciary government is ‘saturated’ with metaphors that have underwritten
oppression and unjust relationships ‘as natural, necessary, and just.’” (quoting Robert W.
Gordon, Law and Ideology, 3 TIKKUN, Jan.–Feb. 1988, at 14, 16)).
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movements mobilize power in multiple ways. In this case, political interests
within and outside of the government aligned to produce a protoadministrative regime that offered temporary, contingent respite from
immigration enforcement.197 Government lawyers in advisory roles used
their ethical discretion to coproduce DACA. Drilling down on the role of
social movements in the construction of the public interest in government
lawyering, particularly in the context of prosecutorial-justice regimes, is an
essential endeavor in the age of mass incarceration and should be the subject
of future work in this area.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have tried to remind legal scholars that lawyers in the
government perform a diverse and heterogeneous array of work related to
immigration policy. Revisiting immigration-enforcement policies of the
Obama administration not only helps to empirically confirm the
centralization theory of DACA advanced by immigration scholars but also
shows that competing notions of professional responsibility and government
lawyering animated the process by which authority was assigned, withdrawn,
and reassigned. We know that government lawyering makes a difference in
the realm of immigration enforcement, and we are just at the beginning stages
of knowing exactly how and why it does.
DACA provides a case study in how a type of administrative justice came
to replace prosecutorial justice, in part due to the ethical discretion exercised
by lawyers acting in advisory functions at the White House and within DHS.
Lawyers must always construct client interests in the varied contexts in which
they work,198 and that construction is never as straightforward as publicchoice theorists might posit. There is a degree of ethical discretion inherent
in the decision-making of all lawyers, including those in service of the
government. A conception of the public interest that may cause the lawyer
to reconstruct their client’s interests through some form of moral dialogue is
an inherent element of the lawyer-client relationship.199 This moral
autonomy is essential in a context in which prosecutorial power remains
largely unchecked. In the case of DACA, administrative justice enabled
government lawyers to advance the public interest.

197. There are analogous historical antecedents worth further examination. See generally
Maggie McKinley, Petitioning and the Making of the Administrative State, 127 YALE L.J.
1538 (2018) (discussing the historical roots of petitioning as a means by which the politically
weak may exercise influence on government).
198. Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717, 776–78 (1987)
(lawyers may enhance types of client autonomy through contestation rather than clientcentered service).
199. See STEPHEN ELLMANN, ROBERT D. DINERSTEIN, ISABELLE R. GUNNING, KATHERINE
R. KRUSE & ANN C. SHALLECK, LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: CRITICAL ISSUES IN INTERVIEWING
AND COUNSELING 279–318 (2009).

